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Abstract 
In this paper we discuss and analyze some of the intelligent classifiers which allows for automatic detection and 
classification of networks attacks for any intrusion detection system. We will proceed initially with their analysis 
using the WEKA software to work with the classifiers on a well-known IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) dataset 
like NSL-KDD dataset. The NSL-KDD dataset of network attacks was created in a military network by MIT Lincoln 
Labs. Then we will discuss and experiment some of the hybrid AI (Artificial Intelligence) classifiers that can be used 
for IDS, and finally we developed a Java software with three most efficient classifiers and compared it with other 
options. The outputs would show the detection accuracy and efficiency of the single and combined classifiers used. 
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1. Introduction 
The computer networks expand on a daily basis and the 
users of Internet are increasing. The sharing of 
information is turning the world into a small village. The 
technology of exchanging information across networks 
had improved the efficiency of data transfer, but it also 
has made more opportunity for cyber-attacks. All of these 
possible network attacks make users, organizations and 
government agencies to want to protect their systems 
from intrusions. The intrusion can be defined as the 
ability to break through a system and trying to 
compromise its integrity, availability, confidentiality or 
quality of service (Abraham and Patra, 2012). There are 
different defense measures employed by most 
organizations to prevent the computer networks and 
sensitive data from intrusion or attacks like 
authentication, firewalls and physical security. All of 
these measures are good but they do not protect against 
sophisticated attacks - say like buffer overflow attacks 
which makes use of the weakness in an application and 
cause enormous security threat. That’s when the need for 
an intrusion detection system (IDS) began to appear. 
They are like a second line of security defense. 
According to (Abraham and Patra, 2012) the IDS can be 
defined as a system of observing suspicious actions that 
happens on computer networks to detect users who are 
not permitted access, trying to breach network devices.  
There are two typical methods of IDS that can be 
implemented on computer networks, namely - Signature 
based and Anomaly based (Benferhat and Tabia, 2004), 
and there are some that is a mix between those two (Elvis, 
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2004). Signature based detection uses a signature 
database to detect suspicious activity, where each 
signature represent a print of known attack. These 
systems are only as good as their database. Therefore the 
database need to be updated continuously to ensure there 
is information about the new intrusions. Anomaly based 
intrusion detection system builds a profile of normal 
system behaviour and detects any deviation from the 
profile to identify possible attacks. The profile can be 
constructed using machine learning techniques and data 
mining and should be upgraded regularly. The advantage 
of anomaly based over signature based is that it can 
identify non-trivial attacks but it has a high tendency for 
generating false alarms (Aydin, 2009). The main 
problems with current IDS are efficiency and accuracy in 
detecting intrusions (Hofmann and Sick, 2011). In this 
paper we are planning to study and analyse the different 
intelligence classifiers of IDS, test some of the hybrid 
approaches, and design a hybrid software system that can 
be accurate and efficient at the same time.     
 
This paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 is the 
related works on intrusion detection done, section 3 is 
introduction to IDS, section 4 is the discussion on dataset 
used, section 5 is the analysis of IDS classifiers, section 
6 is on the developed software system, section 7 is the 
discussion and limitation of our work and section 8 is the 
conclusion. 
2. Related Works 
The first concept of intrusion detection was introduced 
through a paper by (James P. Anderson, 1980) where the 
authors introduced a model that develops a security 
monitoring surveillance to detect anomalies in user 
behaviour.  
 
(Lee and Stolfo, 1998) proposed a systematic framework 
that employs data mining techniques to detect intrusions. 
(Schultz, Zadok, Stolfo, 2001) proposed a framework 
which uses data mining classifiers to train multiple 
classifiers on a set of malicious and benign executables 
to detect new examples. (Nadiammai and Hemalatha, 
2012) presented a study of all ruled based classifiers to 
predict their effectiveness based on accuracy, time, 
specificity, sensitivity and error.  
 
(Hwang, Lee, and Lee, 2007) proposed a three-tier 
architecture of IDS which consist of three lists - black 
list, white list and multi-class. The black list contain any 
known attacks from the traffic, the white list contain the 
rest of the normal traffic, and the third list called multi-
class contains anomalies that are detected in the normal 
traffic. (Tavallaee, Bagheri, Wei, and Ghorbani, 2009) 
presented a study of each feature in KDD ’99 intrusion 
detection dataset. (Subramanian, Srinivasan, and 
Ramasa, 2012) aimed to classify NSL-KDD dataset using 
Random Tree classifier with respect to their metric data 
and study their performance.  
 
(Lippmann, Haines, Fried, J. Korba, and Das, 2000) 
presented a comparison study to the various data mining 
classification techniques for intrusion detection. 
(Srinivasulu, Nagaraju, Kumar, and Rao, 2009) presented 
different data mining techniques named CART, Naive 
Bayesian, and artificial neural network and evaluated the 
performance of each techniques using a confusion 
matrix. (Kalyani and Lakshmi, 2012) presented a 
comparison study between the techniques such as Naive 
Bayes, J48, OneR, PART, and RBF network classifier 
using NSL-KDD dataset; They also discussed the 
advantages of using NSL-KDD dataset over 
KDDCUP’99. (Reddy, IAENG, Reddy, and Rajulu, 
2011) presented a survey of various techniques and the 
enhancement of IDS. (Neethu, 2012) explained about the 
IDS framework that is a combination of Naïve Bayes and 
Principal Component Analysis classifier that helped to 
increase the speed of performance. 
3. Introduction to IDS 
Intrusion detection systems or IDS became very 
important to office security now-a-days. However many 
experts are still unsure about the function of these 
systems, as to why we use them and how they perform. 
The good number of security threats come from inside 
the organization networks because of authorized 
indignant employees. Or sometimes the attacks can be 
through someone with stolen credentials of a valid 
employee, which can be very difficult to trace. The other 
attacks could come from outside users through denial of 
service attacks or through hack attempts to penetrate the 
network. Intrusion detection systems are the only means 
to detect those attacks and respond to threats that occur 
from both inside and outside the organizational network. 
Intrusion detection systems are necessary for a complete 
security infrastructure.  (BAC, 1999) said that using IDS 
allows you to completely supervise a network, regardless 
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of the action being taken, and that information will 
always exist to determine the nature of the security threat 
and its source. Today most medium size organizations 
have installed some form of intrusion detection or 
something similar. Network attacks and intrusion is 
motivated by financial, political, military or personal 
reasons and every network is a potential target. So 
owners of any official network should consider some 
form of IDS, the networks are always at risk of attacks.  
 
In early 2014 the cyber-attacks had caused security 
breach of eBay employee log-ins, allowing access to the 
contact and log-in information of around 233 million 
eBay users.  The Yahoo e-mail service for 273 million 
users was hacked in early 2014, although the exact 
number of accounts affected was not disclosed. In 2013 
the Facebook was attacked by hackers who exploited a 
previously unknown loophole in its computer system. In 
the same year the Facebook hackers attacked Apple 
computers, though no data appeared to have been stolen 
and Burger King's twitter account became victim to 
hackers as well as it began sending out pro-McDonald's 
message. In 2011 Sony was attacked and hackers stole 
private details of more than a million users. In 2007, TJX, 
the parent company of discount stores T.J. Maxx and 
Marshalls, disclosed that thieves had stolen data of tens 
of millions of credit and debit cards. There was a reported 
denial of service attacks in 2000 against Amazon and E-
bay. These consistent and recent attacks shows the need 
to have an intrusion detection system especially for 
commercial network and websites. 
 
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring networks 
and computers for unauthorized access, suspicious 
activity or file modification. IDS can also monitor 
network traffic to detect if the system is being targeted by 
network attacks like the different types of denial of 
service attacks. The two types of intrusion detection are 
Host-Based (HIDS) and Network-Based (NIDS) 
approaches. Each of these attacks has different ways to 
monitor. HIDS examine the personal data held on 
computers, while NIDS looks at the exchange of data 
between computers. 
3.1.  IDS Approaches and Techniques 
For each of the two types of intrusion techniques - HIDS 
and NIDS, there are four basic techniques to detect the 
attacks - Anomaly detection, Misuse detection, Target 
monitoring and Stealth probes. 
3.1.1. Anomaly Detection 
Like the name suggest, anomaly detection is searching 
for suspicious behaviour that the user doesn’t normally 
perform. Example of suspicious behaviour can be as 
follows:  the user log in more than 20 times a day, or 
accessing e-mail that they are not allowed to, or log in at 
2 am or out of the office hours etc. This will be 
considered as an unusual behaviour and will alert the 
system administrator. 
3.1.2. Misuse Detection 
Misuse detection or signature detection is used to identify 
a specific known pattern of unauthorized behaviour to 
predict similar attempts. These patterns are called 
signatures. For example an improper FTP, depending on 
the seriousness of the signature and alarm could be 
triggered or a notification could be sent to the admin to 
handle it. 
3.1.3. Target Monitoring 
These systems do not monitor behaviour or look for 
signatures; they only look for modification in specific 
files and they are designed to undercover the 
unauthorized modification after it occurs. They can be 
checked by computer through cryptographic hash on files 
beforehand and compare the old files with new files. 
These systems can be easy implemented and doesn’t 
require constant monitoring by the administrator. 
3.1.4. Stealth probes 
This approach attempts to detect any attacks that is 
carried out for prolonged periods of time. For example 
the attacks will check for system vulnerabilities and open 
ports and collect data and information about the system 
and then launch the attack say, after two months of the 
original system infection. This method combines 
anomaly detection and misuse detection to discover 
suspicious behaviour. 
4. Discussion on Dataset Used 
We wanted to discuss on the details of dataset used for 
our experiments. This would help to see what kind of 
network attacks are addressed in our work. 
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4.1.  NSS-KDD Dataset 
The DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program by 
MIT Lincoln Labs in 1998 wanted to research into 
intrusion detection.  A wide variety of intrusions 
simulated in a military network was generated and that 
became the 1999 KDD intrusion detection dataset. This 
data contained nine weeks of raw TCP dump data for a 
simulated U.S. Air Force LAN with a number of network 
attacks. The attacks fall into four main categories: (1) 
DoS – Denial of service (2) U2R - Unauthorized access 
from a remote machine (3) R2L - Unauthorized access to 
local super-user privileges (4) Probe - Surveillance and 
other probing. DoS attack are designed to consume all 
network bandwidth and will look like normal traffic. The 
user to root (U2R) attack happens on a local machine to 
elevate the user privileges to that of the super user. 
Remote to local (R2L) activity are attempts to login to a 
computer or device from outside. Probe activity is done 
over the network to collect the details of devices on the 
network.  
 
The KDD training dataset consisted of 494,019 records 
where 97,277 (19.69%) were classified as 'normal', 
391,458 (79.24%) as DoS, 4,107 (0.83%) as Probe, 1,126 
(0.23%) as R2L and 52 (0.01%) as U2R attacks. Each 
record has 41 attributes described different features and 
a label was assigned to each either as an 'attack' type or 
as 'normal' type. (Siddiqui and Naahid, 2013), (KDD Cup 
1999 Data, 2014). Because of this labelling we did not 
need to do any tuning to the dataset. 
 
The basic features of individual TCP connections 
contained the following features: length (number of 
seconds) of the connection, type of the protocol like tcp 
or udp, network service on the destination like http or 
telnet, number of data bytes from source to destination, 
number of data bytes from destination to source, normal 
or error status of the connection, 1 if connection is 
from/to the same host/port; 0 otherwise, number of 
wrong fragments and number of urgent packets. The 
content features within a connection suggested by 
domain knowledge contained the following features: 
number of 'hot' indicators, number of failed login 
attempts, 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise, number 
of 'compromised' conditions, 1 if root shell is obtained 
and 0 otherwise, 1 if 'su root' command attempted and 0 
otherwise, number of 'root' accesses, number of file 
creation operations, number of shell prompts, number of 
operations on access control files, number of outbound 
commands in an ftp session, 1 if the login belongs to the 
'hot' list and 0 otherwise, 1 if the login is a 'guest' login 
and 0 otherwise (KDD Cup 1999 Data, 2014). Table 1 
shows the attack dataset showing the type of attacks 
grouped as four categories. 
 
Table 1. Type of attacks grouped as four categories. 
 
Attacks in 
Dataset 
Attack Type 
 
DoS 
 
apache2, smurf, neptune, dosnuke, land, pod, 
back, teardrop, tcpreset, syslogd, crashiis, 
arppoison, mailbomb, selfping, processtable, 
udpstorm, warezclient 
 
Probe portsweep, ipsweep, queso, satan, msscan, 
ntinfoscan, lsdomain, illegal-sniffer  
 
R2L dict, netcat, sendmail, imap, ncftp, xlock, 
xsnoop, sshtrojan, framespoof, ppmacro, 
guest, netbus, snmpget, ftpwrite, httptunnel, 
phf, named 
 
U2R sechole, xterm, eject, ps, nukepw, secret, perl, 
yaga, fdformat, ffbconfig, casesen, ntfsdos, 
ppmacro, loadmodule, sqlattack 
 
 
The NSL-KDD is a dataset for intrusion detections 
systems and it is originally from KDD’99 dataset but it 
fixes some of the inheritance problems that are 
mentioned in (Tavallaee, Bagheri, Lu, and Ghorbani, 
2009). Although the NSL-KDD dataset still have some 
problems, it is still good for training the IDS and it has a 
reasonable amount of records. This advantage will make 
it perfect for running experiments and the evaluation of 
records will be consistent and comparable. 
 
The NSL-KDD dataset has the following advantages 
over the original KDD dataset. As it avoids the duplicate 
records in the training set and in test sets, there will be no 
bias in the classifiers towards records that are more 
frequent during training and the performance of the 
learners are not biased by the classifiers that have better 
detection rates on the frequent records during testing. The 
number of selected records from each difficulty level 
group is inversely proportional to the percentage of 
records in the original KDD dataset. Thus there is a wiser 
range in the classification rates of distinct machine 
learning methods, which allows an accurate evaluation of 
different learning classifiers (NSL-KDD, 2014). 
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4.2. WEKA Software Study 
The WEKA (2003) software is a program written in Java 
to test out the different available artificial intelligence 
(AI) classifiers. After studying the software, we started to 
test the different classifiers. This software is a really 
helpful tool to decide which classifiers gives the best 
results, after testing it on WEKA software using NSL-
KDD dataset. Like mentioned previously, the NSL-KDD 
is a dataset which is better than the original KDD'99 
dataset and is a good baseline dataset to compare 
different intrusion detection methods. The best results 
given was for Random Forest (RF) with 99.89% 
accuracy, followed by Random Tree (RT) with 99.77% 
accuracy and Naïve Bayes (NB) with 90.38% accuracy. 
4.3. Arguments for and against NSL-KDD dataset 
Thomas and Sharma et al. (2008) states the usefulness of 
DARPA dataset for IDS evaluation. The DARPA 
evaluation dataset has been found to have the required 
potential in modelling the attacks that appear commonly 
on the network traffic. They affirm that the dataset can be 
considered as the base line of any research. The paper 
concludes that it can be used to evaluate the IDSs in the 
present scenario, against the notion that it is a very 
outdated dataset, unable to accommodate the latest trend 
in attacks. Tavallaee and Bagheri et al. (2009) argue that 
although the KDD Cup ’99 datasets suffer from various 
problems, they are still an effective benchmark to 
compare different intrusion detection methods. To 
address some of the known issues a revised version of the 
datasets called NSL-KDD was created. We felt that the 
analysis of NSL-KDD will yield a predictable 
performance results for the intrusion detection algorithms 
we are using. 
 
There are some arguments against using this dataset. 
McHugh (2000) wrote a detailed critique identifying 
shortcomings of KDD dataset evaluations where he 
claimed that the evaluation failed to verify that the 
network realistically simulated a real-world network. 
Mahoney and Chan (2003) also found problems as they 
looked at the content of the 1999 DARPA evaluation 
tcpdump data. They found that the simulated traffic 
contains irregularities where many of the network 
attributes with large range in real-world traffic, have a 
small and fixed range in the simulation. 
5. Analysis of Intrusion Detection System 
Classifiers 
In this section we explain the details of experiments done 
with different classifiers and the results achieved. 
5.1. Experiments Performed 
Several experiments were performed to test out the best 
performance of each of the three selected classifiers – 
Naïve Bayes, Random Tree and Random Forest. All 
experiments were conducted on VAIO Laptop with 
Intel(R) Core I (3), 2.53 GHz CPU and 4.00GB RAM 
with 250GB HDD. There were a total of 10 experiments 
for each of these classifiers as listed below. 
5.1.1. Naive Bayes 
Naive Bayes classifier is group of simple classifiers using 
Bayes' probability theorem with strong independence 
assumptions between the features of what is being binary 
classified (with two states – yes or no). This experiment 
was performed using WEKA software on NSL-KDD 
dataset, the classifier used was Naïve Bayes and the test 
option used was - cross validation of 10 cross folds. From 
table 1 it is evident that the intrusion detection rate is 
90.38% with alarm rate of 9.62%. It is error prone with 
root mean square value of 0.3058 which means it 
performs poorly compared to other classifiers. 
5.1.2. Applying Discretize filter to Naïve Bayes 
We tried applying discretize filter to Naïve Bayes. 
Discretization uses a set of predefined intervals and 
grouping the featured values according to those interval 
values. Or in other words, discretization involves 
dividing an attribute’s values into a number of intervals 
so that each interval can be treated as one value of a 
discrete attribute. Thus the learning complexity of the 
Naïve Bayes classifier can be reduced. The experiment 
was done as before.  As in table 1, you can notice the 
change in accuracy after applying the filter have gone 
significantly up from 90% to over 97%, and the build 
time took only 0.12 seconds while before it was 1.57 
seconds. You can also notice a lower false detection rate 
of 2.87% while it was 9.62% before, and that shows the 
filter is getting much higher results than the normal Naive 
Bayes classifier. 
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5.1.3. Random Tree 
The experiment was done as before, but with 
Random Tree (RT). RT used a certain number of 
randomly chosen attributes at each node of a 
decision tree. It is a predictive model that uses a set 
of binary rules and can be used for classification or 
regression applications. It is quite easy to interpret 
the decision rules. The classification is quick once 
the rules are designed. From table 1 we can infer that 
Random Tree intrusion detection is quite high with 
99.77% accuracy with extremely low false alarm rate 
of 0.11%, which is an excellent performance. It is 
slower than Naïve Bayes where the model build took 
2.59 seconds. A high F-Measure of 99% can also be 
observed. 
5.1.4. Random Forest 
Again the experiment was done as before, but with 
Random Forest (RF). RF is an ensemble classifier that 
combines the results from different models using many 
Random Tree models. Here there is no need to prune trees 
and overfitting is not a problem. As seen from table 1, it 
is evident that Random Forest intrusion detection rate is 
high with 99.89% accuracy with extremely low false 
alarm rate of 0.11%, which is a very high performance. It 
is slower than Naïve Bayes with model build that took 
22.33 seconds. But a high F-Measure of 99% can be 
noted. 
5.1.5. Comparing the classifiers performance using 
ROC curve 
The “Receiver Operating Characteristic” (ROC) curve is 
an alternative to accuracy for the evaluation of learning 
classifiers on natural datasets.  The curve is plotted by 
using the true positive rate against the false positive rate 
at various threshold settings. We tried to compare the 
three classifier’s performance that we worked on - Naïve 
Bayes, Random Tree and Random Forest. The smaller 
the ROC curve and the more close it is to value 1 on y-
axis the better the performance of the classifier. Refer to 
Figure 1. Naïve Bayes performance was slightly less 
good than Random Tree and Random Forest as we can 
see there is some curve on the thick line. Random Tree 
and Random Forest performance was excellent with the 
lack of curve that indicates a high performance of the 
classifiers. 
 
Table 1. Performance of AI classifiers (Cross Validation 
of 10 Cross Folds) 
 
Parameters Naïve 
Bayes 
Naïve 
Bayes with 
Discretize 
filter 
Random 
Forest 
Random 
Tree 
Correctly 
Classified 
Instances 
113858 
(90.38%) 
122353  
(97.13%) 
125835 
(99.89%) 
125678 
(99.77%) 
Incorrectly 
Classified 
Instances 
12115 
(9.62%) 
3620 
(2.87%) 
138 
(0.11%) 
295 
(0.11%) 
Total Number 
of Instances 
125973 125973 125973 125973 
Root mean 
squared error 
0.3058 0.1612 0.0313 0.0479 
Model 
Building Time 
1.57 
seconds 
0.12 
seconds 
22.33 
seconds 
2.59 
seconds 
TP Rate 0.904 0.971 0.999 0.998 
FP Rate 0.101 0.032 0.001 0.002 
Recall 0.904 0.971 0.999 0.998 
F-Measure 0.966 0.997 0.999 0.998 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. ROC for - Naïve Bayes, Random Tree and 
Random Forest (Singular versions) 
5.1.6. Filter Method Naïve Bayes and Wrapper 
Method Naïve Bayes 
To explore some more options under Naïve Bayes as it 
has lower model building times, we worked on the filter 
and the wrapper methods. The Filter Method Naïve 
Bayes uses an attribute evaluator and a ranker to rank the 
entire features in the dataset. The number of features we 
want to select from the vector can be defined. Then we 
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can omit the features one at a time that have the lower 
rank and we can see a predictive accuracy of the 
classifier. We can only omit a certain number of features 
until we reach the global minimum –“the point where you 
cannot omit features”. If we omit more than the number 
of global minimum the dataset will start overfeeding and 
we will get an increased number of incorrectly classified 
instances. We ran the ranker with the global minimum of 
41, which means we can omit the entire feature from 
bottom until we reach 41. While omitting and retesting 
we noticed an increase of accuracy each time as in table 
3. The Naïve Bayes accuracy was initially 90.38%, but 
with the filter the accuracy has gone up to 90.72%.  
 
In the wrapper method we used a subset evaluator and 
this created all possible subsets from the featured vector. 
After using the classifier like Naïve Bayes to induce 
classifiers from the features in each subset, it will then 
consider the subset of features with which the 
classification classifier perform the best. We ran the test 
and the best featured subset was number (3, 4, 17). After 
elimination of all except for these three, the results were 
96.22 % accurate as in table 3. We observed that the 
detection accuracy was still lower than the best ones so 
far. 
 
Table 3. Performance of Filter Method Naïve Bayes and 
Wrapper Method Naïve Bayes (Cross Validation of 10 
Cross Folds) 
 
Parameters Naïve Bayes – 
Filter Method 
Naïve Bayes – 
Wrapper Method 
Correctly Classified 
Instances 
114283 (90.72%) 121216 (96.22%) 
Incorrectly Classified 
Instances 
11690 (9.28%) 4757(3.78%) 
Total Number of 
Instances 
125973 125973 
Root mean squared 
error 
0.3007 0.193 
Model Building Time 2.19 seconds 1.62 seconds 
TP Rate 0.907 0.962 
FP Rate 0.1 0.038 
Recall 0.907 0.962 
F-Measure 0.968 0.984 
5.1.7. Combining Three Classifiers – The Best 
Accuracy 
After performing all of previous experiments we 
combined the three classification classifiers - Naïve 
Bayes (discretized), Random Tree, Random Forest on 
Weka, and we compared their performance in ROC 
curve. The result was high performance with 99.9% 
accuracy. So we decided to use these three classifiers to 
build a software system to detect intrusions. Refer to 
figure 2 for ROC curve in comparison to figure 1. There 
is no curve at all on the thick line. As stated before the 
smaller the ROC curve and the more close it is to value 1 
on y-axis the better the performance of the classifier. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. ROC for - Naïve Bayes, Random Tree and 
Random Forest (Combined version) 
6. Developed Software System 
In order to test these classifiers and their performance we 
developed a software in Java to detect intrusions on a 
network or on a dataset. Using software libraries and Java 
compiler, this system will function by first training 
discretized Naïve Bayes classifier separately using K2 
learning process. The reason we choose K2 is because it 
shows high performance, and it can improve the intrusion 
detection of Naïve Bayes classifier. After training the 
Naïve Bayes the dataset will go through two other 
training sessions using Random Tree and Random Forest. 
These two classifiers will maximize the chance of 
detecting more intrusions that can pass through Naïve 
Bayes classifier. After that we will create a method called 
Junction Tree inference. The idea of this procedure is to 
construct a data structure called a junction tree which can 
be used to calculate any query through the message 
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passing on the tree (Jemili, Zaghdoud and Ben Ahmed, 
2007). 
6.1. K2 Learning Process 
K2 classifier works by finding the best structure amounts 
to pick the best parents for each node supposing we 
already know a total ordering on the nodes (Cooper, 
Herskovits, 1992). K2 is a greedy search classifier and it 
works as follows. Suppose we already know the ordering 
of each node, the classifier will incrementally add a set 
of parents and that addition increases the score of the 
resulting structure. When no addition of a single parent 
can increase the score, the classifier will stop adding 
parents to that node. Based on the assumption that we can 
add a parent to each node independently, in our system 
we used this classifier to train our classifier using 
Bayesian Network which uses Naïve Bayes classifier. 
6.2. Naive Bayes 
A Naive Bayes classifier works on the principle that the 
presence or absence of a specific feature of a class is 
independent or unrelated to the presence or absence of 
any other feature. 
 
As per (Statsoft, 2014), be it continuous or categorical - 
Naive Bayes classifiers can handle a random number of 
independent variables. Given a set of variables, X = {x1, 
x2, x..., xn}, we want to construct the posterior 
probability for the event Cj among a set of possible 
outcomes C = {c1, c2, c..., cn}. Thus X is the predictors 
and C is the set of categorical levels present in the 
dependent variable. As we use the Bayes' rule, we get the 
following equation (1): 
 
where p(Cj | x1,x2,x...,xn) is the posterior probability of 
class membership, i.e., the probability that X belongs to 
Cj. With the assumption that the conditional probabilities 
of the independent variables are statistically independent 
we can decompose the likelihood to a product of terms as 
in equation (2): 
 
 
6.3. Bayesian Network 
The Bayesian network is a representation suited to 
looking for relationships among a large number of 
variables. With large set of variables, it is a graphical 
model that efficiently models the joint probability 
distribution. It is a graphical representation among a set 
of random variables (Pearl, 1988). Consider this example 
as given in Bayesnet.com: Consider the finite set 
X={X1,…,Xn} of discrete random variables, were each 
Xi may take the value from a finite set, denoted by 
Val(Xi). Bayesian network is a graphical representation 
that encodes joint probability distribution over X. The 
nodes of the graph correspond to the random variables 
X1,…,Xn. The graphical links correspond to the direct 
influence from one variable to another. If there is a direct 
link between the variable Xi and the Variable Xj then the 
variable Xi will be a parent to the variable Xj. Figure 3 is 
an example of Bayesian network (Cooper, 1999). 
 
 
Fig. 3 Bayesian Network (Cooper, 1999). 
6.4. Random Tree 
The Decision tree consists of nodes that form a rooted 
tree. It is a directed tree root node that has no incoming 
edges but only outgoing ones. Like a binary tree, all other 
nodes have exactly one incoming edge. A node with 
outgoing edges is called an internal or test node. All other 
nodes are called leaves (also known as terminal or 
decision nodes). In a decision tree, based on a function 
with input value of attributes, each test or internal node 
splits the instance space into multiple sub-spaces (Oded, 
and Lior. 2010) as in figure 4. A Random tree considers 
K randomly chosen attributes at each node of a decision 
tree. 
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Fig. 4. Decision Tree on Responses to Direct Mailing 
(Oded, and Lior. 2010) 
6.5. Random Forest 
Random forest grows many classification trees. The ideas 
is as follows. To classify new object from an input vector, 
put the input vector of each tree in the forest. Each tree 
will give a classification, and the tree vote for that class. 
The forest chooses the classification having the most 
votes. The reason we choose this classifier is because we 
are using a large dataset, and the trees tend to give high 
performance when using large datasets.  
 
If the number of cases in the training set is N, sample ‘n’ 
cases at random from the original data, where n < N. This 
sample will be the training set for growing the tree.  If 
there are R input variables,  a number r < R is specified 
at each node, r variables are selected at random out of the 
R and the best split the node. The value of r will be held 
constant during the period of tree growing. In random 
forest there is no pruning, so each tree will grow the 
largest extent possible. The Random forest as in figure 5 
combines trees and though the trees are weak learners, 
the Random forest is a strong learner. The Random Forest 
error rate depends on two things: (1) the connections 
between any two trees in the forest and excess 
connections in the forest increase the error rate; (2) the 
strength of each tree in a Forest and increasing the 
strength of individual trees decreases the error rate. 
 
Most important features of the Random forest are as 
follows: The accuracy is unpredictable depending on the 
training set. On large datasets the performance is 
efficient. It can handle thousands of inputs without 
having to delete any variables. It can give an estimation 
of the most important variables to the classifier. It is the 
most effective method for estimating missing data and 
maintain accuracy when a large proportion of data is 
missing. It can balance errors in class population for 
unbalanced datasets. The generated forests can be saved 
for future uses on other data. The computed prototypes 
 
 
Fig. 5. Random Forest (CitizenNet and Blackwell, A., 2012). 
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can give information about the relations between 
variables. It can detect variables interactions. 
6.6. Implemented Software Building Blocks 
The software system that we developed in Java is shown 
in figure 6 and will function as follows: First we train 
NSL-KDD dataset that has two classes - normal and 
anomaly, through K2 learning process. It will take the 
data from the dataset and train it to detect certain patterns, 
and then decide if it’s a normal behaviour or an anomaly. 
The K2 training will consist of Bayesian Network 
classifier which will help detecting anomalies in the 
dataset. After the Bayesian Network detection is over, the 
system will go through a second training using the 
Random tree classifier to detect any threats that the 
Bayesian Network might have missed. Then the dataset 
will go through a third training using Random forest 
classifier to detect any anomalies that might have been 
missed by the previous classifiers. When the training is 
complete we will open new connection to the junction 
tree which will connect every node to a parent and predict 
anomalies from the normal behaviour. 
6.7. Overall Detection Accuracy Results 
The testing was initially done on a smaller dataset (20% 
on NSL-KDD dataset). The accuracy was 99.67% where 
few instances were classified wrong. The overall results 
were high with 83 instances classified wrong out of 
25109 instances. 29 anomalies were classified normal 
and 54 normal were classified anomalies. The reason we 
got lower results from what we tested in Weka is because 
we used 20% of the dataset, and trees perform better on 
larger datasets. Refer to table 4. Then we performed the 
test on the full NSL-KDD dataset. The results for the full 
dataset was very high, i.e. 99.99%.   
 
 
Fig. 6. System Design Classes and their relationship 
 
From the table 4 it is clear that combining the three 
classifiers gives the highest accuracy with intrusion 
detection rate of 99.99% with an extremely low false 
alarm rate of 0.01%. This is quite encouraging compared 
with all other categories. Although it is slower to build 
the model with 24.97 seconds than all other classifiers, 
the classifier makes up for it in high detection rate. 
Further, high F-value of 100% and high precision 100% 
and recall 100%, makes it a very good result overall, 
which is why we chose to combine and use the classifiers 
Table 4. Detection Accuracy Comparison 
 
 Naïve 
Bayes 
Random 
Forest 
Random 
Tree 
Discretize 
Filter Naive 
Bayes 
Filter 
Method 
Naïve 
Bayes 
Wrapper 
Method 
Naïve 
Bayes 
Combined 
Classifiers 
20% NSL-
KDD 
Combined 
Classifiers 
Full NSL-
KDD 
Detection Rate (%) 90.38 99.89 99.77 97.13 90.72 96.22 99.67 99.99 
False Positive Rate (%) 0.134 0.002 0.003 0.054 0.151 0.42 0.005 0.001 
Model Building Time (Sec) 1.57 22.33 2.59 0.12 2.19 1.62 3.23 24.97 
Precision (%) 0.89 0.999 0.998 0.954 0.88 0.964 0.996 1 
Recall (%) 0.936 0.999 0.998 0.994 0.958 0.966 0.998 1 
Root Mean Squared Error 0.3058 0.0313 0.0479 0.1612 0.3007 0.193 0.116 0.0086 
 
 
 Enhancing IDS Detection Accuracy 
instead of using it separately. The accuracy comparison 
graph can be seen in figure 7. 
7. Discussion and Limitations of our Work 
The work done focuses mainly on the four attack types - 
DOS, U2R, R2L and Probe in the dataset used. So the 
attacks outside these could go unnoticed, as we have not 
trained and tested them. Our focus was to show that a 
hybrid version of classification algorithms can work 
better on a given intrusion detection dataset rather than 
individual ones. The use of an active or passive traffic 
analyser in conjunction with our software will help to 
monitor new attacks. So the use of network security 
monitors like “bro” can only complement our findings. 
Even though we have used NSL-KDD dataset which is 
done in 1999, the kind of network attack types remain 
quite similar even now, even though there are emerging 
and new kinds of attacks. It is true that some new attacks 
inside and outside of these categories will always evolve. 
We are sure that if we train the software with newer 
attack types, such attacks could as well be detected too, 
as the software is intelligent and adaptable to changes. 
The work we have done is only at a prototype level where 
we have not tested the software with real-time traffic. It 
may not be that easy to generate a similar dataset with 
real time traffic with different kinds of attacks as in NSL-
KDD dataset as it was generated in an exhaustive manner 
in a military network. We will try to address this in our 
future work. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper we have outlined the importance of intrusion 
detection systems, and have analyzed the performance of 
some of the detection classifiers in relation to NSL-KDD 
dataset. Finally we developed a software system in Java 
to detect intrusion on networks using the same dataset. 
Bayesian network has the capabilities to provide auto 
detection, and they learn from auditing data which can be 
either normal or abnormal. This was combined with 
Random tree and Random forest classifiers to get better 
detection accuracy. The system demonstrated a high 
performance in detecting intrusion with 99.67% accuracy 
on 20% of the NSL-KDD dataset and 99.99% accuracy 
on the full dataset with a model building time of 24 
seconds. The higher accuracy was because we used trees 
in the classifiers, and they tend to give a higher 
performance when used on large datasets. It should also 
be noted that for different datasets different individual 
classifiers may work well or bad, but a combination of 
best performing classifiers can behave more consistently 
across different datasets. 
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